The Long Fuse, S01E04: "The Declaration"

Runtime: 34:01 · Season One · A Will Sigmon Media production Season / Episode: 1 / 4 · episodeType: full

Cold open

Tuesday, August twenty-eighth, two thousand one. At FBI headquarters, the analyst the Commission calls "Jane" sends a lead she began drafting the week before. It goes to the FBI's New York field office. It asks agents there to find Khalid al-Mihdhar. Her email tells the New York agent she wants him to get started as soon as possible. But she labels the lead "Routine." In the Commission's words, that is "a designation that informs the receiving office that…

About this episode

August 28, 2001: a "Routine" lead asks New York agents to find Khalid al-Mihdhar. Then back to 1996: bin Laden's declaration of war, the CIA's bin Laden unit, and the years when the people paid to listen tried — and mostly failed — to make the rest of the government hear what he had said out loud.

Disclaimer: a dramatization based on public records, including The 9/11 Commission Report, court filings and trial testimony. Some scenes and dialogue are reconstructed or composited. Voices are AI-generated and are not intended to resemble any real person. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any person or agency depicted. Allegations in court filings are unproven claims. No private victim is named beyond the public record, and people the Commission identified only by pseudonym keep those pseudonyms.

Content note

This episode discusses terrorism and the events leading to the September 11 attacks. No victim is voiced or depicted. No hijacker speaks.

Beat outline / chapters

These are narrative beats from the production script, not timed audio chapters.

• ROUTINE. Washington and New York. August 28, 2001
• Opening titles
• JALALABAD. May to September 1996
• A SAFE BASE. August 1996
• THE STATION WITH NO COUNTRY. Langley, 1996 to 1997
• THE OFFER THAT WASN'T. Khartoum, 1995 to 1996
• THE PILOT. Nairobi and Khartoum. 1993 to 1995
• TARNAK FARMS. Fall 1997 to May 1998
• FEBRUARY 23, 1998
• THE AMERICAN. Peshawar, Pakistan. 1992
• NAIROBI. December 1993 to August 1998
• AUGUST SIXTH. Nairobi, 1998
• AUGUST 7, 1998
• THE MAN WHO RAN. Nairobi and Karachi, August 1998
• KHOWST. August 20, 1998
• DELENDA. Fall 1998
• THE PROMISE. Kandahar, Riyadh and Islamabad. 1998
• TWO DAYS BEFORE. Washington, August 1998 to 2000
• THREE CHANCES. December 1998 to May 1999
• NEW PARTNERS. 1999
• THE PAKISTANI TEAM. June to October 1999
• UP TO SOMETHING. July to December 1999
• BACK TO AUGUST

Key people

• Osama bin Laden
• Khalid al-Mihdhar
• CIA Bin Laden Unit (Alec Station)
• The Record (narrator)

Key places

• ROUTINE. Washington and New York. August 28, 2001
• JALALABAD. May to September 1996
• A SAFE BASE. August 1996
• THE STATION WITH NO COUNTRY. Langley, 1996 to 1997
• THE OFFER THAT WASN'T. Khartoum, 1995 to 1996
• THE PILOT. Nairobi and Khartoum. 1993 to 1995
• TARNAK FARMS. Fall 1997 to May 1998
• FEBRUARY 23, 1998
• THE AMERICAN. Peshawar, Pakistan. 1992
• NAIROBI. December 1993 to August 1998
• AUGUST SIXTH. Nairobi, 1998
• AUGUST 7, 1998

Sources

CR1–CR12 = *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004), chapters 1–12, verified against the official text against the archived chapter HTML (govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/, text). CRN = the Report's endnotes. FADL1/2 = *US v. bin Laden*, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.), al-Fadl testimony Feb 6/7, 2001 (CNS transcript PDFs). RAHMAN2D = *United States v. Rahman*, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). YOUSEF2D = *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). ODEH2D = *In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa* (*US v. Odeh*), 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008). FRUS = *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1977–80 (history.state.gov). Others are named in each Basis.

Scene-by-scene source notes (from production script Basis)

• 1. "ROUTINE." Washington and New York. August 28, 2001. CR8 §8.2 ("Mihdhar"): "Jane" began drafting the lead after the Aug. 23 discovery, "not sent until August 28"; the "headsup" call; her email wanting him to start as soon as possible; "Routine" and "a designation that informs the receiving office that it has 30 days to respond"; forwarded to the squad supervisor, then to an intelligence agent "who thus was behind 'the wall'", the Cole case agents and the agent who had searched in Malaysia for KSM; no higher management informed; not substantively discussed above "deputy chief of a section within the Counterterrorism Division" (paraphrased). Aug. 28, 2001 was a Tuesday (calendar). Mihdhar at the Kuala Lumpur mee

• 3. JALALABAD. May to September 1996. CR2 §2.5: return in May 1996 to Jalalabad; "It is unlikely that Bin Ladin could have returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved", ISI "probably had advance knowledge ... may have facilitated" (paraphrased); "in his weakest position since his early days in the war against the Soviet Union"; Sudan's seizure of his businesses; members disengaging; Banshiri remained in Kenya, drowned in a ferryboat accident on Lake Victoria "just a few days after Bin Ladin arrived in Jalalabad"; Taliban controlled much of the country but not Kabul; options kept open (Hekmatyar, not named); Sept. 1996 fall of Jalalabad and Kabul; ties cemented; freedom of movement, no visas, vehicles and we

• 4. "A SAFE BASE." August 1996. CR2 §2.5: "Bin Ladin, no longer constrained by the Sudanese, clearly thought that he had new freedom to publish his appeals for jihad"; August 1996 fatwa issued as the Taliban drove toward Jalalabad and Kabul; "a safe base here is now available in the high Hindu Kush mountains in Khurasan"; CNN interview March 1997; Mullah Omar "invited" him to Kandahar. CR2 §2.1: "The long, disjointed document", drive American soldiers out of Saudi Arabia, condemned the monarchy, praised Beirut 1983, Aden 1992 and Somalia 1993. "Not a scholar of Islamic law": CR2 §2.1

• 5. THE STATION WITH NO COUNTRY. Langley, 1996 to 1997. CR4 §4.1 "Early Efforts against Bin Ladin": "hardly anyone in the U.S. government understood ..." and "extremist financier"; the 1996 "virtual station", David Cohen's idea (not named here), terrorist financial links unit, the former analyst who ran the Islamic Extremist Branch and "was especially knowledgeable about Afghanistan", the suggestion to focus on one individual, "Thus was born the Bin Ladin unit."; a dozen officers; "Mike" (pseudonym kept); al-Fadl's walk-in and the "major breakthrough" (paraphrased); 1997: military committee, nuclear material; "found connections everywhere", Aden, Somalia, Manila. "Viewed as alarm

• 6. THE OFFER THAT WASN'T. Khartoum, 1995 to 1996. CR4 §4.1: Sudanese–Saudi discussions in late 1995; Saudis declined (citizenship revoked); Ambassador Timothy Carney encouraged expulsion (named in the Report; unnamed here); Fatih Erwa's claim; "The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so."; no legal basis because no indictment was outstanding. Score note: E05's "none" scenes with the Record use SCORE_UNDER_RECORD; set to B if produced.

• 6a. THE PILOT. Nairobi and Khartoum. 1993 to 1995. UBL Day 8–9 (*US v. Usama Bin Laden*, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, SDNY; Kherchtou direct, Feb. 21–22, 2001; transcripts from cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-08.htm and -09.htm, cleaned to ubl08.clean.txt / ubl09.clean.txt), verified against the official text: born in Morocco 1964, catering school, bakeries in France, Corsica, Italy, to Pakistan Jan. 23, 1991 (paraphrased); sent by Saif al Islam (military committee; title only on air) to study flying; "Flying the aircraft and one day I will be the Usama Bin Laden's pilot." (VERBATIM); October '93 arrival; CMC Flying School at the Nairobi airport (school not named on air); tuition paid from al Qaeda funds per his testimony; errands for members transiting to/from Somalia (paraphrase

• 7. TARNAK FARMS. Fall 1997 to May 1998. CR4 §4.1 "The CIA Develops a Capture Plan": "Mike" and "a stroke of luck"; Afghan tribals; fall 1997 plan to capture and hand over for trial; Tarnak Farms, "about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall", on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport; mapping of wives' houses and his likely sleeping place; rehearsals in the US in fall 1997; the two-group plan, desert landing zone, CIA plane; briefing papers acknowledging casualties and "Sooner or later ... perhaps using WMD"; Schroen's "about as good as it can be" and 40 percent; 30 percent figure to Reno, Freeh and Mary Jo White; Ma

• 8. FEBRUARY 23, 1998. CR2 §2.1: February 1998 fatwa published by Al Quds al Arabi in London, "World Islamic Front", five signers (CRN2 fn 1 lists them), none scholars of Islamic law; "America had declared war against God and his messenger" (paraphrased); murder of any American anywhere; the duty clause ("individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it") is paraphrased on air, not read; the ABC interview three months later and the quoted two sentences; "Though novel for its open endorsement of indiscriminate killing". CR2 §2.5: "a kind of public launch of a renewed and stronger al Qaeda"; merger with EIJ; "the decisio

• 8a. THE AMERICAN. Peshawar, Pakistan. 1992. UBL Day 8 (Kherchtou direct, Feb. 21, 2001; ubl08.clean.txt), verified against the official text: ~1992 (he was "not quite sure" early or late), Abu Hafs's instruction at a meeting at Bin Ladin's house (Abu Hafs = "al Qaeda's military chief"; CR2 calls him a top military committee member); "strict man ... not gentle," "not a good practitioner of Islam" (paraphrased); Hayatabad, Peshawar; "Abu Mohamed al Amriki." and "The American." (VERBATIM); Egyptian, spoke only Arabic with him; ~two weeks; two groups of four; Olympus and Canon; shooting without the camera to the eye, a checker behind; red-light developing; report contents (paraphrased); Anas al Liby's two computers (unnamed on air); bridges, stadium, police

• 9. NAIROBI. December 1993 to August 1998. CR2 §2.5 "The Embassy Bombings": casing from December 1993; Ali Mohamed as former Egyptian army officer, US Army enlistee, Fort Bragg instructor, trainer of extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn; photo lab in a Nairobi apartment; January 1994 review by bin Laden, Banshiri and Abu Hafs; "an easy target because a car bomb could be parked close by"; Hage as on-site manager, US citizen, Afghanistan in the 1980s; August 1997 search and phone tap; the panic; Harun Fazul's fax, "in grave danger"; teams set up, materials, an extra explosives expert, trucks bought shortly before; d

• 9a. AUGUST SIXTH. Nairobi, 1998. UBL Day 9 (Kherchtou direct, Feb. 22, 2001; ubl09.clean.txt): June 1998 job offer, pilot speaking English and Arabic, Gulf tourism clients (paraphrased); "At the time you had this meeting ... did you think at the time that this was a legitimate business offer? A Yes."; tourism questionnaire on Sudan; meeting Haroun (Harun Fazul, the cell manager named in CR2 §2.5; unnamed on air) and Ahmed Tawhil (unnamed) near the Jamia mosque; airport drop-off; second meeting "on August 6, 1998," date picked by the businessman; Meridian Hotel; unanswered calls; Haroun's wife's words as Kherchtou recounted them: "because we are all moving tomorrow -- I mean traveling tomorrow." (VERBATIM, his account of her

• 10. AUGUST 7, 1998. CR2 §2.5: trucks drove into the embassies roughly five minutes apart, "about 10:35 A.M. in Nairobi and 10:39 A.M. in Dar es Salaam"; Nairobi: embassy destroyed, 12 Americans and 201 others "almost all Kenyans", about 5,000 injured; Dar es Salaam: 11 killed, no Americans. ODEH2D ¶17 gives "approximately 10:30 a.m." and 224 killed including twelve Americans (consistent: 213 + 11). CR4 §4.2: more Americans killed at Khobar Towers (1996) and Beirut (1983); "the demonstration of an operational capability ...". Aug. 7, 1998 was a Friday (calendar). Dignity: no names, no description of injuries, no recreated sound (bible: no attack SFX; beds drop to room tone). "Embassy staff,

• 11. THE MAN WHO RAN. Nairobi and Karachi, August 1998. CR4 §4.2: "Unusually good intelligence, chiefly from the yearlong monitoring of al Qaeda's cell in Nairobi, soon firmly fixed responsibility on him and his associates" (paraphrased). ODEH2D ¶8, ¶18–19: Odeh's late-night flight to Karachi the day before, arrest the next morning for improper travel documents, explosives residue on clothing and luggage; al-'Owhali "left the truck shortly before the bomb detonated and was seen fleeing the scene by an eyewitness", arrested Aug. 12 by Kenyan authorities acting with US agents; May 29, 2001 verdicts against Odeh, al-'Owhali and El-Hage; life sentences (Oct. 2001). The fourth defendant (Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Dar es Salaam) was tried in the same tri

• 12. KHOWST. August 20, 1998. CR4 §4.2: Tenet's intelligence at the principals meeting the day after, gathering near Khowst; Berger's account that bin Laden would attend; quick consensus; "The strike's purpose was to kill Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants" (paraphrased); al Shifa, the EMPTA soil sample, VX; Mary McCarthy's "rather uncertain at this point"; Aug. 20 launch from the Arabian Sea; "most of them hit their intended targets"; no leader killed; Tenet's after-action review via Berger, 20–30 killed, "probably missed Bin Ladin by a few hours"; Lewinsky scandal; Republican questions about timing; "The next month, Gingrich's office d

• 13. "DELENDA." Fall 1998. CR4 §4.2 "A Follow-On Campaign?": Clarke's hope for a sustained campaign; "Political-Military Plan Delenda", the Carthage reference; elements (diplomacy, covert action/capture, money, follow-on military action); never formally adopted; Cohen's "rope ladders" and Shelton's "jungle gym"; the ASD/SOLIC paper and its three quoted phrases; "went no further"; "too aggressive"; Lodal "cannot remember the episode or the paper at all" (paraphrased). Officials other than Clarke are identified by title only. No words are invented.

• 13b. THE PROMISE. Kandahar, Riyadh and Islamabad. 1998. CR4 §4.1 (end of "Tarnak Farms" narrative): Crown Prince Abdullah's promise to Tenet of "an all-out secret effort" (paraphrased; dated by the sealed indictment issued "a few days later, on June 10"), Prince Turki as emissary, summer meetings with Mullah Omar, "a mixture of possible incentives and threats", a commitment that Bin Ladin would be expelled, not kept. CR4 §4.3 "Diplomacy": Aug. 22, 1998, Mullah Omar to "a working-level State Department official" (strikes counterproductive; open to dialogue); Taliban delegates with Ambassador Milam ("against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary"; Saudi Arabia question); September 1998 Turki–Omar meeting, the refusal, shouting, Omar deno

• 13c. TWO DAYS BEFORE. Washington, August 1998 to 2000. CR4 §4.3 "Diplomacy": the acting counterterrorism coordinator's recommendation to designate Pakistan, "activities in support of international terrorism", Kashmir; opposed by the South Asia bureau after the May 1998 nuclear tests; "Secretary Albright rejected the recommendation on August 5, 1998, just two days before the embassy bombings."; her explanation (paraphrased). The Saudi thread: Madani al Tayyib (unnamed here), detained in 1997; repeated US requests; Gore's renewal of the request with Crown Prince Abdullah in September 1998; "The United States never obtained this access." The NSC-led trips to Gulf states in 1999 and 2000, NSC, Treasury and intelligence representativ

• 14. THREE CHANCES. December 1998 to May 1999. CR4 §4.4 (Dec. 1998): Dec. 20 intelligence on the Haji Habash house, part of the governor's residence in Kandahar; Schroen's "Hit him tonight-we may not get another chance."; urgent teleconference; Zinni's estimate "well over 200" and the mosque; principals decided against recommending a strike; "Mike"'s "I'm sure we'll regret not acting last night". §4.5 "In fairness": "Bin Ladin left his room unexpectedly, and if a strike had been ordered he would not have been hit" (paraphrased as "apparently ... might have missed"; the Report states it flatly, so the script is if anything more cautious). §4.5 "The Desert Camp, February 1999": Sheikh Ali hunting camp sout

• 14b. NEW PARTNERS. 1999. CR4 §4.5, "The Desert Camp, February 1999" (final paragraphs; fn 160–164), "Looking for New Partners" (fn 168–172): CIA hopes the camp would draw him back; Clarke's March 7, 1999 call to a UAE official; his memo that the call was approved and cleared with the CIA; CIA officials' denial; the camp "hurriedly dismantled" within a week; CIA officers "irate" (Pavitt and "Mike" not named on air); the CTC chief's lottery comparison; the push, supported by Clarke, for a Northern Alliance partnership; Massoud: "Afghanistan's most renowned military commander", hero of the Soviet war, massacres, heroin, "ruthless warlord" (paraphrased), Tenet's "most interesting possible new ally" (par

• 14c. THE PAKISTANI TEAM. June to October 1999. CR4 §4.4 (Pakistan paragraphs; fn 96–100): Clinton's June 1999 contact with Sharif, "in the strongest way I can,"; the oil and Karachi-imports suggestion; Sharif's capture proposal, Washington's skepticism and the President's blessing; the early-July meeting (Kargil omitted), approval for U.S. assistance in training a Pakistani special forces team; the October 1999 coup and "the plan was terminated" (paraphrased); Under Secretary Pickering (not named on air), "borne little fruit.". No overlap: EP4 §13b covers 1998 Pakistan diplomacy (Turki/Omar), EP5 §5b covers 2000 (Musharraf, Clinton's stopover), and EP5 §3b the December 1999 envoy.

• 14d. "UP TO SOMETHING." July to December 1999. CR4 §4.3 (Taliban paragraphs; fn 86–92): the July 1999 executive order "effectively declaring the Taliban regime a state sponsor of terrorism" (paraphrased); the October UN resolution (UNSCR 1267, unnamed) with economic and travel sanctions; Clarke to Berger, "the Taliban appear to be up to something."; the cabinet shuffle and hints; Somalia; "remote possibility" of Yemen; the $250 million Saudi idea, "huge grant to a regime as heinous as the Taliban", "seems to have quietly died"; Omar's indifference, refusal to meet non-Muslims; the unanimous end-1999 reaffirmation; "had executed at least one subordinate who opposed his pro-Bin Ladin polic

• 15. BACK TO AUGUST. CR8 §8.2: "One of the Cole case agents read the lead with interest, and contacted 'Jane' to obtain more information"; the exclusion of the criminal agents and the Commission's judgment that they "were thus excluded from the search" though knowledgeable about al Qaeda and experienced at finding suspects. Date: CRN8 n. 80 cites "FBI email, Jane to John L., 'Fwd: Re: FFI Request,' Aug. 29, 2001" for this contact; n. 81–82 date the NSLU emails Aug. 29, 2001. "Thirteen days": Aug. 29 to Sep. 11.

The 9/11 Commission Report: https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm

Credits

Written and produced by Will Sigmon for Will Sigmon Media. Narrated by The Record (AI voice).

Listen next

Next: Episode 5, "The Cole" — Aden harbor, October 12, 2000, and the wall that kept the investigators out.

Episode page: https://shows.willsigmon.media/long-fuse/episodes/s01e04

---

Disclaimer: a dramatization based on public records, including The 9/11 Commission Report, court filings and trial testimony. Some scenes and dialogue are reconstructed or composited. Voices are AI-generated and are not intended to resemble any real person. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any person or agency depicted. Allegations in court filings are unproven claims. No private victim is named beyond the public record, and people the Commission identified only by pseudonym keep those pseudonyms. The Long Fuse is produced by Will Sigmon Media. The narrator, The Record, and the few unnamed composite characters in the dramatized scenes are synthetic voices; no victim, hijacker or real official is voiced, and documented words are read by The Record as attributed quotations. Quotations from The 9/11 Commission Report keep its spelling, "Bin Ladin".

Plain-text transcript · Download MP3