The Long Fuse, S01E05: "The Cole"

Runtime: 34:00 · Season One · A Will Sigmon Media production Season / Episode: 1 / 5 · episodeType: full

Cold open

Wednesday, August twenty-ninth, two thousand one. In New York, the agent working the Cole case who read the lead on Khalid al-Mihdhar wants to help find him. At FBI headquarters, "Jane" tells him he can't. He's a criminal agent, she says, not an intelligence agent, and the wall keeps him out of the search. She felt, the Commission says, that he had to destroy his copy of the lead. He asks her to get a ruling from the Bureau's national security lawyers.

About this episode

August 29, 2001: a Cole case agent is told he cannot help find Mihdhar — the wall keeps him out. Then back to the millennium and October 12, 2000, when a small boat hit the USS Cole in Aden, and what followed when the people who investigated it were kept behind that wall.

Disclaimer: a dramatization based on public records, including The 9/11 Commission Report, court filings and trial testimony. Some scenes and dialogue are reconstructed or composited. Voices are AI-generated and are not intended to resemble any real person. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any person or agency depicted. Allegations in court filings are unproven claims. No private victim is named beyond the public record, and people the Commission identified only by pseudonym keep those pseudonyms.

Content note

This episode discusses terrorism and the events leading to the September 11 attacks. No victim is voiced or depicted. No hijacker speaks.

Beat outline / chapters

These are narrative beats from the production script, not timed audio chapters.

• SOMEDAY SOMEONE WILL DIE. New York. August 29, 2001
• Opening titles
• THE TIME FOR TRAINING IS OVER. Amman, Jordan. Late 1999
• MAKE SOME DECISIONS NOW. Washington. December 1999
• PORT ANGELES, WASHINGTON. December 14, 1999
• THE PLANES OPERATION. Kandahar, Mes Aynak and Karachi. 1999
• THE BOX CUTTER. Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Hong Kong. December 1999 to January 2000
• KUALA LUMPUR. January 2000
• WHAT HAPPENED IN BANGKOK. January 2000
• A CHANCE DISCOVERY. Washington and Islamabad. January to December 2000
• FOLLOW THE MONEY. Washington, spring 2000
• THIRTY MILLION A YEAR. What the Commission later learned
• SAN DIEGO. 2000
• A ROOM IN SAN DIEGO. San Diego. Spring to fall 2000
• AFGHAN EYES. Fall 2000
• THE RECRUIT. Jalalabad, Yemen and Kandahar. 1996 to 1998
• THE NEXT WARSHIP. Yemen and Afghanistan, September 2000
• OCTOBER 12, 2000. Aden, Yemen
• THE INVESTIGATION. Aden, late 2000
• NO RESPONSE. November 2000 to January 2001
• THE HANDOFF. December 2000 to March 2001
• KHALLAD IN THE PHOTOGRAPH. January 2001

Key people

• Khalid al-Mihdhar
• Nawaf al-Hazmi
• USS Cole investigators
• The Record (narrator)

Key places

• SOMEDAY SOMEONE WILL DIE. New York. August 29, 2001
• THE TIME FOR TRAINING IS OVER. Amman, Jordan. Late 1999
• MAKE SOME DECISIONS NOW. Washington. December 1999
• PORT ANGELES, WASHINGTON. December 14, 1999
• THE PLANES OPERATION. Kandahar, Mes Aynak and Karachi. 1999
• THE BOX CUTTER. Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Hong Kong. December 1999 to January 2000
• KUALA LUMPUR. January 2000
• WHAT HAPPENED IN BANGKOK. January 2000
• A CHANCE DISCOVERY. Washington and Islamabad. January to December 2000
• FOLLOW THE MONEY. Washington, spring 2000
• SAN DIEGO. 2000
• A ROOM IN SAN DIEGO. San Diego. Spring to fall 2000

Sources

CR1–CR12 = *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004), chapters 1–12, verified against the official text against the archived chapter HTML (govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/, text). CRN = the Report's endnotes. FADL1/2 = *US v. bin Laden*, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.), al-Fadl testimony Feb 6/7, 2001 (CNS transcript PDFs). RAHMAN2D = *United States v. Rahman*, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). YOUSEF2D = *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). ODEH2D = *In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa* (*US v. Odeh*), 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008). FRUS = *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1977–80 (history.state.gov). Others are named in each Basis.

Scene-by-scene source notes (from production script Basis)

• 1. "SOMEDAY SOMEONE WILL DIE." New York. August 29, 2001. CR8 §8.2 ("Mihdhar"): the Cole case agent read the lead "with interest" and contacted "Jane"; her argument that as a "criminal" agent the wall kept him from participating; she felt he had to destroy his copy (NSA caveats); his request for an NSLU opinion; her email ("only as an intelligence matter ... only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even be present at any interview"); "She appears to have misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to this situation" (paraphrased); the agent's reply, both paragraphs. Date: CRN8 n. 80–82 cite "FBI email, Jane to John L., 'Fwd: Re: FFI Request,' Aug. 29, 2001", "FBI email,

• 3. "THE TIME FOR TRAINING IS OVER." Amman, Jordan. Late 1999. CR6 §6.1 "'Bodies Will Pile Up in Sacks'": Nov. 30, 1999 intercept, Abu Zubaydah ("a longtime ally of Bin Ladin") and Khadr Abu Hoshar ("a Palestinian extremist"), "The time for training is over."; 16 arrested; the targets (SAS Radisson, border crossings, two Christian holy sites, crowded with tourists); the subbasement under a rented house, "71 drums of acids, several forged Saudi passports, detonators" (paraphrased); Hijazi born in California, cabdriver in Boston; Deek a naturalized US citizen in Peshawar; the motto. "Diplomacy and Disruption": the CIA warning; the Dec. 8 night meeting and the CSG tasking;

• 3b. "MAKE SOME DECISIONS NOW." Washington. December 1999. CR6 §6.1 "The Millennium Crisis": Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999, "If George's [Tenet's] story about a planned series of UBL attacks at the Millennium is true, we will need to make some decisions NOW." (only the final clause "we will need to make some decisions NOW." is read verbatim; the conditional is paraphrased); CIA warning of a larger millennium series, "some possibly involving chemical weapons"; Principals Committee, night of Dec. 8, tasks the CSG; Sheehan's warnings to the Taliban; "Mike was not diplomatic," Clarke reported to Berger (the quote read is the predicate "was not diplomatic" only); no Taliban response; Zinni as special envoy to Musharraf, came back empty-handed; Ambassado

• 4. PORT ANGELES, WASHINGTON. December 14, 1999. CR6 §6.1 "Ressam's Arrest": age 23, illegal immigration to Canada (1994), falsified passport, petty crime; recruited by an alumnus of Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp, trained in Afghanistan in 1998; left with precursor chemicals in toiletry bottles, a notebook of bomb instructions and $12,000; LAX chosen "as the largest and easiest to operate in surreptitiously"; Vancouver, windows open, cough drops; rented Chrysler, spare tire well; Dec. 14, 1999 ferry from Victoria to Port Angeles; waited to be the last car off; customs officers noticed his nervousness and referred him to secondary inspection; he tried to run during a pat-down; white powder and viscous liquid assumed drug-related until an insp

• 4b. THE PLANES OPERATION. Kandahar, Mes Aynak and Karachi. 1999. CR5 §5.3 ("The Plan Evolves"; "Training and Deployment to Kuala Lumpur"; fn 39–54): the March or April 1999 Kandahar summons; "planes operation"; the spring 1999 al Matar meetings with Atef (the compound described, not named); the initial target list and each man's preference "According to KSM"; the four selectees; Hazmi and Mihdhar as Saudi nationals born in Mecca, Bosnia 1995, visas already obtained; the Yemeni visa problem and the two-part plan, "a refinement of KSM's old Manila air plot" (paraphrased; EP3 §13 tells the Manila plot); Mes Aynak, "an abandoned Russian copper mine near Kabul", Bin Ladin's personal selection; Karachi safehouse rented with Bin Ladin's money; K

• 4c. THE BOX CUTTER. Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Hong Kong. December 1999 to January 2000. CR5 §5.3, fn 56–60: Khallad's prosthesis at the Endolite clinic, Bin Ladin's suggestion to case flights; Malaysia "ideal" (no visa for Saudis and Gulf citizens; "lax" security reputation; wounded mujahideen treated there and "successfully concealed the origins of their injuries"); Dec 31 Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok; next day to Hong Kong "aboard a U.S. airliner", first class "a mistake" (no view of the cockpit); the box cutter in his toiletries kit; on the return the search that "just glanced at the contents and let him pass"; the dozing first-class passengers; "None of the flight attendants took notice." (paraphrased). All "according to Khallad", as the Report attributes it. Khallad's lost leg:

• 5. KUALA LUMPUR. January 2000. CR6 §6.1: Jan. 3, 2000 attempt on USS *The Sullivans* in Aden, the overloaded boat sank, equipment salvaged unknown; "A Lost Trail in Southeast Asia": NSA analysis late 1999, "an operational cadre", Nawaf, Salem, Khalid; Mihdhar identified, tracked from Yemen, arrived Kuala Lumpur Jan. 5; other unidentified Arabs; Jan. 8 departure to Bangkok of three; CIA officers in Bangkok received the information too late; "disappeared into the streets of Bangkok" (paraphrased); early March report of Hazmi's Jan. 15 United flight to Los Angeles; no report of Mihdhar although he was on it; no one outside CTC told; no TIPOFF watchlisting in January ("when word arrived of Mihdhar's visa") or

• 5a. WHAT HAPPENED IN BANGKOK. January 2000. CR5 §5.3, fn 61–63: Khallad's planned Singapore meeting with Nibras and Fahd al Quso (not named on air), operatives in Nashiri's ship-bombing plot, days after the failed attack on USS The Sullivans; money from Yemen; no Singapore visas; meeting moved to Bangkok; Hazmi and Mihdhar's tourist-stamp reason ("reportedly"); separate hotels, then the same hotel, and Khallad's insistence the groups never met; Khallad back to Karachi and Kandahar to report to Bin Ladin; the spring 2000 cancellation of the East Asia part, "too difficult to coordinate" (paraphrased); Hazmi and Mihdhar to Los Angeles Jan 15 (§5). Nibras's role in the Cole attack: CR5 fn 48 ("Ibrahim al Thawar, or Nibras, who would parti

• 5b. A CHANCE DISCOVERY. Washington and Islamabad. January to December 2000. CR6 §6.2 "Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000": the CIA leadership told the millennium might be only the "kick-off"; Clarke to Berger, Jan. 11, 2000, "not put too much of a dent"; "chance discovery" by U.S. Customs; NSC staff, "nibbling at the edges", not "if" but "when" and "where" (paraphrased); Principals Committee, March 10, 2000, three steps; JTTF expansion moved forward; the centralized translation unit "did not". "Pressing Pakistan": the NSC staff note; Inderfurth and Sheehan with Musharraf, January 2000 (not narrated); Clinton's March 25, 2000 stopover over Secret Service and CIA warnings; Clinto

• 5c. FOLLOW THE MONEY. Washington, spring 2000. CR6 §6.2 "Building New Capabilities: The CIA": the after-action review and the March 10 principals' endorsement of the CIA as lead; the millennium alert used up the CTC's funds; "the Bin Ladin unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation"; the CIA's managers' argument (shortchanged since the end of the Cold War); Clarke's view; Clarke's account of Pavitt (head of the Directorate of Operations; title only on air) wanting the money, and "I didn't want to put more good money after bad."; Pavitt's counter (paraphrased); "a modest supplemental appropriation ... But the CIA still believed that it remained underfunded" (paraphrased). "Terrorist Fin

• 5d. THIRTY MILLION A YEAR. What the Commission later learned. CR5 §5.4 "A Money Trail?" ("General Financing"; fn 110–131), verified against the official text: ~$30 million per year, "raised almost entirely through donations" (paraphrased); core facilitators in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia; some donors knew, others did not; imams diverting zakat; sympathizers in branch offices of large charities with lax oversight (al Haramain named in the CR, not on air); entire charities possibly controlled by operatives (al Wafa named in the CR, not on air); no government other than the Taliban; the Saudi sentence and its parenthetical caveat (paraphrased closely); hawala; spending; $10–20 million per

• 6. SAN DIEGO. 2000. CR7 §7.1: "ill-prepared for a mission in the United States"; qualifications (devotion, veteran service, valid visas); little or no English; no substantial time in the West; two weeks in Los Angeles with movements unknown; Feb. 1, 2000 encounter with Omar al Bayoumi at a halal restaurant in Culver City; Feb. 4 move to San Diego; Bayoumi helped find an apartment, co-signed the lease, helped open a bank account; "we have seen no credible evidence that he believed in violent extremism or knowingly aided extremist groups" (paraphrased); English classes then pilot training; Mihdhar left San Diego June 9 to return to Yemen; Hazmi stayed in a rented room until mid-December, then lef

• 6a. A ROOM IN SAN DIEGO. San Diego. Spring to fall 2000. CR7 §7.1 (fn 28–42): "lived openly in San Diego under their true names, listing Hazmi in the telephone directory" (paraphrased); the used car, "to help a fellow Muslim brother."; April $5,000 wire from Dubai via the Islamic Center administrator's account, sender KSM's nephew Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (unnamed on air; "the planner" = KSM per series usage); "young and ideologically like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia," some holding extremist beliefs (paraphrased; individuals other than Aulaqi not named on air); Aulaqi: Rabat mosque imam, born in New Mexico, interview statements, "unable to learn enough ... to reach a conclusion" (paraphrased; Aulaqi's statements

• 7. AFGHAN EYES. Fall 2000. CR6 §6.2: the Joint Staff effort (Fry, Gration; not named here) from late 1999/early 2000 to reduce the lag between sighting and striking; the telescope option dismissed as impractical; the Predator; "Afghan Eyes"; the CIA–DoD cost dispute and White House cost-sharing; Sept. 7 first flight; "truly astonishing"; the tall man in a white robe at Tarnak Farms; Sept. 28 second sighting, "probably Bin Ladin"; Berger's margin note, "I will want more than verified location"; the MiG scramble; "bonanza"; 10 of 15 missions successful; "Unfortunately ... another tunnel.". CR6 §6.5: Clarke "favored resuming

• 7a. THE RECRUIT. Jalalabad, Yemen and Kandahar. 1996 to 1998. CR5 §5.1 "Abd al Rahim al Nashiri" (fn 27–30): appears to have been recruited by Bin Ladin himself; Tajikistan 1996 with some 30 mujahideen; Jalalabad, Bin Ladin recently back from Sudan; "jihad against the Americans."; loyalty urged, many including Nashiri "found the notion distasteful and refused" (paraphrased); indoctrination; idea took shape in Yemen ("he says"; his account); return probably in 1997; "the coming battle with the United States."; Taliban vs. Northern Alliance; antitank-missile plot early 1998; cousin Azzam a Nairobi bomber (unnamed here; told in EP4); late-1998 proposal, approval, money; reporting directly; "reportedly" instructed to case

• 7b. THE NEXT WARSHIP. Yemen and Afghanistan, September 2000. CR6 §6.3 (fn 121–124): Khallad and Nashiri as coordinators; original target a commercial vessel, "specifically an oil tanker", Bin Ladin urging a U.S. warship (paraphrased); Nashiri as field commander; Afghan-jihad veteran per CR5 §5.2; Sept. 2000, Bin Ladin "reportedly" wanting to replace Khamri and Nibras (unnamed here); Nashiri angry, going to Afghanistan to explain they were trained and ready; instructions to attack the next U.S. warship to enter Aden; "While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance." (paraphrased). Not elsewhere in the arc.

• 8. OCTOBER 12, 2000. Aden, Yemen. CR6 §6.3: January 2000 failure; Oct. 12, 2000 attack; small boat laden with explosives; friendly gestures; "The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40" (paraphrased); "The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Ladin."; target, location, operatives, money; Quso did not arrive in time to film. "Refueling": the Cole was in Aden for a scheduled refueling stop (Navy JAGMAN / DoD USS Cole Commission report, Jan. 2001); not in the CR text (gap; cite before release). Oct. 12, 2000 was a Thursday. Memorial claim: the USS Cole Memorial at Naval Station Norfolk (dedic

• 9. THE INVESTIGATION. Aden, late 2000. CR6 §6.3 "Investigating the Attack": FBI, NCIS, CIA teams; Yemeni objection to long guns; Ambassador Bodine and John O'Neill clashed, Bodine refused his return (both named in the Report; unnamed here); McLaughlin's "smell, look, and taste" (paraphrased); the need for a link to a known operative; arrests of Badawi and Quso; Nov. 11 information on Khallad, lost leg, direction from Afghanistan or Pakistan; the FBI agent's recognition; the source's "run boy" and the explosives accident; Khallad's links to the 1998 bombings; Nashiri identified; "strong evidence ... during the second half of November"; corroborated in December. Sensitivity: O'Neill later died at the World Trad

• 10. NO RESPONSE. November 2000 to January 2001. CR6 §6.3: evacuation of the Kandahar airport compound, rotating among residences; "There was no American strike."; Feb. 2001 source on "the big instructor" wanting the US to attack, else "something bigger" (paraphrased; "probably a reference to Bin Ladin" per the Report); the propaganda video by KSM's media committee with a reenactment, aired in part on Al Jazeera, CNN and others. "Considering a Response": Dec. 21 CIA briefing slides, "preliminary judgment", "supported the attack", "no definitive answer"; Clinton's account; Tenet's "magic words" (paraphrased); Clarke's "holding back"; Sheehan's question. CR6 §6.5: "

• 10b. THE HANDOFF. December 2000 to March 2001. CR6 §6.4 "Change and Continuity": the 36-day dispute "cut in half the normal transition period"; "a notable absence of serious discussion of the al Qaeda threat or terrorism" in the campaign (paraphrased). CR6 §6.3 (end): the CTC's "Blue Sky" memo, sent to Clarke Dec. 29, 2000; Northern Alliance support to tie down al Qaeda fighters; "no single 'silver bullet'"; Clarke's December 2000 strategy paper, "roll back" over three to five years; "Continued anti-al Qida operations at the current level will prevent some attacks," and "but will not seriously attrit their ability to plan and condu

• 11. KHALLAD IN THE PHOTOGRAPH. January 2001. CR8 §8.1 "January 2001: Identification of Khallad": two photos shown in early January 2001; source didn't recognize Mihdhar, "90 percent certain" the other was Khallad; "making Mihdhar seem even more suspicious"; "Yet we found no effort by the CIA to renew the long-abandoned search for Mihdhar or his travel companions."; CIA did not notify the FBI; FBI primary Cole investigators had no knowledge until after 9/11; "mutual goodwill"; source spoke essentially no English; the CIA officer usually did not translate; the identification appeared in internal operational reports the FBI agent could not access. "The man who helped direct the attack": CR6 §6.3 (Yemeni and source informa

The 9/11 Commission Report: https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm

Credits

Written and produced by Will Sigmon for Will Sigmon Media. Narrated by The Record (AI voice).

Listen next

Next: Episode 6, "The Quiet Student" — Mohamed Atta, from the Nile Delta to Hamburg to Florida.

Episode page: https://shows.willsigmon.media/long-fuse/episodes/s01e05

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Disclaimer: a dramatization based on public records, including The 9/11 Commission Report, court filings and trial testimony. Some scenes and dialogue are reconstructed or composited. Voices are AI-generated and are not intended to resemble any real person. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any person or agency depicted. Allegations in court filings are unproven claims. No private victim is named beyond the public record, and people the Commission identified only by pseudonym keep those pseudonyms. The Long Fuse is produced by Will Sigmon Media. The narrator, The Record, and the few unnamed composite characters in the dramatized scenes are synthetic voices; no victim, hijacker or real official is voiced, and documented words are read by The Record as attributed quotations. Quotations from The 9/11 Commission Report keep its spelling, "Bin Ladin".

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